JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
A FIRST AMENDMENT ODYSSEY
GEOFFREY R. STONEt

At the time of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s appointment to
the Supreme Court of the United States, first amendment doctrine
was in its infancy. The Court had not yet addressed the issues of
obscenity or libel, it had made only passing acquaintance with the
complexities of commercial advertising and the concept of the
public forum, it had not yet discovered the content-based/content
neutral distinction, its protection of subversive advocacy was more
theoretical than real, and its overall free speech jurisprudence was
rigid, simplistic, and incomplete. At the time ofJustice Brennan's
retirement some thirty-four years later, the Court's free speech
doctrine was far richer, more subtle, and more speech-protective
than ever before in our nation's history. Justice Brennan, it is fair
to say, was the primary architect of this revolution in our understanding of the freedom of speech.
During his long tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan established himself as one of the staunchest defenders of the freedom of
speech the Court has ever known. Of the 252 free speech decisions
in whichJustice Brennan participated, 1 the Court accepted the free
speech claim in 148, or 59%, of the cases. Justice Brennan accepted
the free speech claim in 221, or 88%, of these cases. 2 Thus, during
t Harry Kalvenjr. Professor of Law and Dean, University of Chicago Law School.
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like to thank my colleagues Marcella David, Cass Sunstein, Dennis Hutchinson, and
Abner Greene for their helpful comments.
I This only includes cases decided with full opinions. It does not include, for
example, the thirty-one decisions in the area of obscenity from 1967 to 1973 that
were decided with only one line opinions. See, e.g., Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434
(1970) (per curiam) (reversing the Ohio Supreme Court in one sentence and citing
only Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam) (protecting the
distribution of allegedly obscene publications under the cloak of the first amendment)).
2 Approximately one-half of the thirty-one cases in whichJustice Brennan rejected
the first amendment claim involved regulations designed to "improve" the
marketplace of ideas, regulations of obscenity, or regulations of speech designed to
promote competing interests of equality. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) (upholding state limitation on corporate political
spending during elections); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding state statute requiring Rotary Club to admit
women); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding state
statute requiring admission of women toJaycees group); First Nat'l Bank of Boston
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his thirty-four years on the Court, Brennan was 50% more likely
than the Court as a whole to protect the freedom of speech.A
Moreover, in only two cases from 1956 to 1990 didJustice Brennan
reject a free speech claim that the Court accepted, and these were
both cases in which the regulation of free expression was designed
to "improve" the marketplace of ideas. 4 This is a remarkable
record, indeed. In this Essay, I will trace a few of the many
highlights of Justice Brennan's extraordinary first amendment
odyssey.
The portrayal of sex ... is not itself sufficient reason to deny
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press.... Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life,
has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
5
through the ages.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of obscenity in
Roth v. United States.6 Roth was decided during Justice Brennan's

v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (joining White's dissent which criticizes the Court's
striking down a state statute which restricted corporate spending in referendum
elections); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (upholding
federal statute allowing customs agents to seize obscene materials); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding state obscenity statute).
The other one-half of these cases are scattered throughout the entire corpus of
first amendment law. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986) (upholding a suspension for student profanity in high school); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (denying tax
exemptions to politically active organizations); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (upholding child pornography statute); United States Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding restriction on use of
mailboxes for unstamped materials); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
(criticizing, in dissent, the Court's refusal to grant libel immunity to certain
statements of a senator); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (sustaining state
prohibition on use of trade names by optometrists); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555 (1978) (upholding censorship of prisoners' outgoing mail); NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (upholding federal labor law prohibiting employer
threats against employees for union organizing); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (upholding federal law criminalizing draft card burning).
3 It is noteworthy that, although the percentage of cases in whichJustice Brennan
voted to uphold the free speech claim remained essentially the same in the first and
second halves of his tenure (87% in the first half vs. 88% in the second half), the
Court as a whole upheld 85% the free speech claims from 1956 to 1973, but only 51%
from 1973 to 1990.
4 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politcal Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
5 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
6 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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first term on the Court, and it was his first opinion for the Court in
a case involving the freedom of speech. It was an opinion he would
come to regret.
The central holding in Roth was that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press." 7 This holding
was premised upon four critical judgments. First, in a passage that
fully anticipated Robert Bork's philosophy of original intent,
Brennan reviewed the status of obscenity at the time the Constitution was adopted and concluded that "there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity ... was outside the
protection intended for speech and press."8 Second, Brennan
invoked "the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50
nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20
obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956."9
Third, embracing the "two-level" theory of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire10 and Beauharnais v. Illinois,1 1 Brennan concluded that,
because obscenity is one of the "'well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem, ' " 12 it may
be restricted "without proof either that ... [it] will perceptibly
create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will
probably induce its recipients to such conduct."13 Finally, Brennan rejected the argument that "obscenity" is too imprecise a
concept to meet constitutional standards, declaring that all the
Constitution requires "is that the language 'conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices,'"14 and that the existence
of "marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of
the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient
15
reason to hold the language too ambiguous."
7 Id. at 485.
8 Id. at 483.

9 Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
10 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
12
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
13 Id. at 486 (footnotes omitted).

14 Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)).

15 Id. at 491-92 (quoting Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7).
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Brennan's casual reading of original intent, his uncritical
acceptance of the significance of consensus, his embrace of the
notion that "obscenity" is "unprotected" because it is "without
redeeming social importance," and his cavalier dismissal of concerns
about vagueness all reflected the dominant free speech jurisprudence of the time. Anticipating later developments, Brennan did
observe in Roth that the "fundamental freedoms of speech and press
have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our
free society" and that "[c]easeless vigilance" is therefore "the
watchword to prevent their erosion." 16 But in articulating the four
critical judgments noted above, Brennan effectively eschewed such
vigilance and embraced a highly formalistic, originalist, and wooden
approach to first amendment analysis. The following year, Justice
Brennan would help set in motion a jurisprudential revolution that
eventually would call all these judgments into question. In Roth,
though, Brennan got the revolution off to a limping start, indeed.
To deny an exemption to [those] who engage in certainforms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.... The [State
is] plainly mistaken in [its] argument that, because a tax exemp17
tion is a "privilege"... its denial may not infringe speech.
During the post-World War II "cold war" era, fears over national
security generated wide-ranging federal, state, and local restrictions
on "radical" speech. These restrictions included the extensive use
of loyalty oaths, emergency detention programs, attempts to
"outlaw" the Communist Party, requirements that communist-front
and communist action organizations register with the government,
legislative investigations of suspected "subversives," direct criminal
prosecutions, and the denial of employment and other governmental "benefits" to individuals who were not "loyal" to the United
States.
At the time Justice Brennan joined the Court, such programs
were aggressively enforced at all levels of government and the
nation was consumed with its effort to suppress subversive expression. Prior to Brennan's appointment, the Court did not take a
strong stand in defense of the freedom of speech in the face of this
powerful anticommunist campaign. In American Communications
16 Id. at 488.
17 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
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Association v. Douds,18 for example, the Court upheld section 9(h)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, which prohibited
the National Labor Relations Board from enforcing employee
representation rights of any labor union whose officers failed to
execute affidavits that they were not members of the Communist
Party. In Adler v. Board of Education,19 the Court upheld a New
York law prohibiting any person who joined any organization that
advocated the violent overthrow of the government, with knowledge
of the organization's advocacy, from teaching in any public school.
And, in Dennis v. United States,20 the Court upheld the convictions
of the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States under
the Smith Act, which prohibited any person to "advocate ... the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying any government in the United States by force or
21
violence."
The abuses and overreaching of this era had a profound effect
on Justice Brennan's understanding of the freedom of speech. In
the eye of this anticommunist hurricane, Brennan first sketched out
the contours of his unique contribution to our first amendment
jurisprudence.

A central feature of the anticommunist program was the denial
of government employment and other benefits to "subversives." In
upholding such restrictions, the pre-Brennan Court frequently
relied upon the so-called "right/privilege" distinction. This doctrine
held that government constitutionally could withhold benefits from
individuals who engaged in constitutionally protected expression,
for which they could not be criminally punished, because the
individuals had no "right" to the "privilege" itself. In Barsky v.
Board of Regents,22 for example, the Court invoked this distinction
in upholding the suspension of a physician's medical license because
of events arising out of his communist affiliations. Four years later,
23
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Speiser v. Randall
emphatically rejected the right/privilege distinction.
Speiser involved a California law that established a special
property tax exemption for veterans, but it denied the exemption
18 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
19 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

20 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
21 Id. at 496.
22 347 U.S. 442
23 357 U.S. 513

(1954).
(1958).
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to any veteran who advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Brennan rejected the state's argument that the disqualification was lawful because it merely withheld a "privilege." Brennan
explained that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for their
speech," because the "deterrent effect is the same as if the State
were to fine them for this speech." 24 Thus, Brennan concluded,
the state was "plainly mistaken" in its "argument that, because a tax
25
exemption is a 'privilege'.. . its denial may not infringe speech."
Brennan's rejection of the right/privilege distinction in Speiser
was a critical step in the evolution of first amendment doctrine, but
it did not end the case. Brennan proceeded in Speiser to articulate
a second-and equally important-principle of first amendment
jurisprudence.
Turning to the procedure mandated by the
California law, Brennan held that the statute violated the first
amendment because it required the applicant to prove that he had
not advocated the violent overthrow of government. Brennan
observed that "[t]he vice of the present procedure is that, where
particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the
unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding--inherent in all
litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be
penalized." 26 Moreover, such an allocation of the burden of proof
effectively could chill free expression since "[t]he man who knows
that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the
lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the
27
unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens."
Unlike Brennan's first foray into first amendmentjurisprudence
in Roth, which embodied a cautious, formalistic, and tradition-bound
approach, his second foray, in Speiser, revealed an impressive
willingness to question accepted first amendment doctrine in the
light of a more speech-protective conception of the freedom of
speech. Moreover, in stark contrast with his opinion in Roth,
Brennan's effort in Speiser, inspired by the political and historical
realities of the era, displayed an extraordinary sensitivity to the
procedures by which government regulates free expression. This
special emphasis on procedure, which would play a pivotal role in
subsequent decisions limiting government efforts to suppress
24 Id. at 518.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 526.
27 Id.
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subversive advocacy, 28 was to become a hallmark of Justice
Brennan's first amendment jurisprudence.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the militant Negro civil
rights movement has engendered the intense resentment and
opposition of the politically dominant white community of
Virginia; litigation assisted by the NAACP has been bitterly
fought. In such circumstances, a statute broadly curtailinggroup
activity leading to litigation may easily become a weapon of
29
oppression.
Justice Brennan's understanding of the freedom of speech was
influenced, not only by government efforts to suppress communism,
but by the civil rights movement as well. One of the most distinctive features of this movement was its attempt to enlist the support
of the federal courts in the protection of federal constitutional
rights through a carefully orchestrated strategy of systematic
litigation. As Harry Kalven once observed, this effort was designed
"to trap democracy in its own decencies."3 0 To a South hostile to
Brown v. Board of Education,3 1 the NAACP "appeared, and accurately, as a militant army led by lawyers determined to see to it that 'all
32
deliberate speed' [had] some meaning."
Prior to Brown, the State of Virginia had made no effort to
restrict the litigation activities of the NAACP. Shortly after Brown,
however, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Tennessee all enacted legislation that expressly
prohibited any organization to retain a lawyer in connection with
litigation to which it was not a party and in which it had no
pecuniary right or liability.3 3 Such legislation would effectively
have crippled the efforts of the NAACP to enforce the mandate of
Brown.
28 See e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating a New

York law prohibiting school teachers from uttering "seditious" words); Cramp v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (invalidating on grounds of vagueness
a Florida loyalty oath for teachers); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(invalidating an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to list every organization in which
they held memberships as a condition of employment).
' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963) (citations omitted).
30

H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 (1965).
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32 H. KALVEN, supra note 30, at 69.
3
3 See Button, 371 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In NAACP v. Button,3 4 the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, held such legislation invalid as applied to the NAACP.
Brennan rejected the contention that "'solicitation' is wholly outside
the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment" because
"a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by
mere labels." 5 Brennan explained that "[i]n the context of
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving... equality of treatment...
for the members of the Negro community."3 6 In such circumstances, litigation is "a form of political expression" and "[g]roups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the
ballot frequently turn to the courts."3 7 For these groups that the
NAACP assists, "litigation may be the most effective form of
"3
political association. 8

By bringing litigation within the ambit of first amendment
protection, Brennan's opinion in Button highlighted the central role
of the courts as effective instruments of political and social change
and, at the same time, empowered organizations like the NAACP to
pursue aggressively the vindication of constitutional rights.
Moreover, in invalidating the Virginia legislation, Brennan
elaborated on his concern, first enunciated in Speiser, that the Court
must take special care to scrutinize the procedures by which
government regulates free expression. Indeed, it was in Button that
Brennan first coined the phrase "overbreadth," and it was in Button
that Brennan gave impetus to the nascent first amendment
vagueness doctrine. Building explicitly upon Speiser, Brennan
explained that the "objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth" derives from "the -danger of tolerating, in the area of First
Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible
of sweeping and improper application." 9
Because "[t]hese
freedoms are delicate and vulnerable," the "threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,"40 and "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity." 4 1 These themes of "overbreadth,"
3 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
35 Id. at 429.
36
id.
37 id.
38 Id. at 431.

39 Id. at 433 (footnote and dtation omitted).
40 Id. (citations omitted).
41 Id. (citation omitted). Brennan fully explained the rationale of the overbreadth
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"vagueness," "chilling effect," "breathing space," and "narrow
specificity," first clearly articulated by Brennan in Button, would
come to dominate the evolution of first amendment jurisprudence
for the next quarter century.
[We consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited,robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
42
attacks on government and public officials.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,43 Justice Brennan's most prominent first amendment opinion, the Court for the first time considered the extent to which the freedom of speech limits the award of
damages in a libel action brought by public officials against critics
of their official conduct. Sullivan, an elected Commissioner of the
City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against
four black clergymen and The New York Times alleging that he had
been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement that
described the civil rights movement in the South and concluded
with an appeal for funds. The trial judge submitted the case to the
jury under instructions that a public official was entitled to recover
damages for defamatory statements unless the speaker could prove
that the statements were true. Under these instructions, the jury
returned a judgment for Sullivan in the amount of $500,000.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule of law
applied by the Alabama court violated the first amendment. At the
outset, Justice Brennan confronted the Court's own past declarations, including Brennan's own pronouncement in Roth, that libel,
one of the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
doctrine in his opinion for the Court in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972):
[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity." This is deemed necessary because persons whose
expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising
their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible
of application to protected expression.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
42 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citations omitted).
43 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem," 44 is not "within the area of
constitutionally protected speech." 45 In rejecting these past
declarations, Brennan expressly invoked his own rejection of the
"solicitation" label in Button and explained that "we are compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the
46
epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law."
Indeed, like "the various other formulae for the repression of
expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." 47 To the
contrary, libel "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
48
Amendment."
Turning to the task of articulating these standards, Brennan
observed in an oft-quoted passage that "we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open." 49 Drawing upon history in a quite different way
than he drew upon history in Roth, Brennan analogized the civil law
of libel, as applied by the Alabama court, to the Sedition Act of
1798, which had been invalidated "in the court of history" because
of the restraint it "imposed upon criticism of government and
50
public officials."
The essential difficulty, Brennan explained, is that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate," and even false statements of
fact must therefore "be protected if the freedoms of expression are
to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ...

to survive. ' "5 1

Thus, the Alabama rule of law could not be "saved by its allowance
of the defense of truth," for a "rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual assertions" would
lead to intolerable "self-censorship." 52 Echoing Speiser, Brennan
observed that, under such a rule, "would-be critics of official
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though
44 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942), quoted in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
45 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,266(1952), quoted in Roth, 354 U.S. at 486.
46 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted).
47 Id.
48 Id.

49 Id. at 270.
50 Id. at 276.
51 Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
52 Id. at 278-79.
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it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because
of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense
of having to do so."5 3 Such a rule, Brennan added, "dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate." 54 With these
considerations in mind, Brennan concluded that public officials may
not recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to their
official conduct unless they can prove "that the statement was made
...
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
55
whether it was false or not."
Brennan's opinion in New York Times revolutionized the law of
libel and, perhaps more important, signalled a critical shift in our
first amendment jurisprudence.
Indeed, the distance Justice
Brennan-and the Court-had traversed in the seven years from Roth
to New York Times is simply stunning. All four of the judgments that
made up the core of Brennan's opinion in Roth were effectively
reversed in New York Times.
In Roth, Brennan gave great weight to the "originalist" conclusion that, at the time the first amendment was adopted, "obscenity
56
was outside the protection intended for speech and press."
...
In New York Times, however, Brennan gave no weight to the "originalist" view, despite his observation in Roth that "[a]t the time of the
adoption of the First Amendment" the law of libel was even more
"fully developed" than the law of obscenity. 57 In Roth, Brennan
gave great weight to the fact that every state restricted the expression of obscenity. In New York Times, however, Brennan gave no
weight to the analogous "consensus" about libel. In Roth, Brennan
embraced the Chaplinsky-Beauhamais "two-level" theory and held
that, because obscenity was "unprotected" by the first amendment,
no further constitutional scrutiny was warranted. In New York Times,
however, Brennan dismissed the invocation of "the epithet 'libel'"
and insisted that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations." 58 Finally, in Roth, Brennan gave short
shrift to the claim that the concept of obscenity is too imprecise to
meet constitutional standards. In New York Times, however, Brennan
expanded upon his observations in Speiser about burdens of proof
53 Id. at 279.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 279-80.
5 Rot, 354 U.S. at 483.
57 Id.
58

376 U.S. at 269.
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and precision of regulation and his reflections in Button about
"breathing space" and "chilling effects," to fashion a more sensitive,
less formulaic, and more speech-protective mode of first amendment analysis.
New York Times did not, of course, "solve" the libel puzzle, for it
left many important questions unanswered. What New York Times
did do, however, was to take the essential first step in the effort to
adjust in an appropriate and sensitive manner the inherently
conflicting interests in individual reputation and the freedom of
speech. Moreover, by abandoning the strict "two-level" theory of
"protected" and "unprotected" expression, Brennan's opinion in
New York Times ushered in a new era of first amendment doctrine
in which the Court, freed from the rigid constraints of the past, has
been able to adopt a more flexible mode of analysis to deal with a
broad range of "low value" expression. 59 Finally, by locating "the
central meaning of the First Amendment"60 in the controversy
over seditious libel, Brennan's opinion in New York Times identified
"a core protection of speech without which democracy cannot
function" and thus put the 'theory of the freedom of speech clause
61
... right side up for the first time."
As Alexander Meiklejohn
and Harry Kalven observed, the decision in New York Times was truly
62
an "occasion for dancing in the streets."
New York Times cannot be fully understood without recognizing
that it was driven, not only by concerns about free expression, but
also, like Button, by the unique historical circumstances in which it
arose. Like other devices designed to obstruct the civil rights
movement, the $500,000 libel judgment against the Times and the
black clergymen who sponsored the advertisement was designed to
dampen the drive for civil rights. Indeed, if the Alabama jury's
massive damage award had been sustained on the basis of the
technical inaccuracies involved in the dispute, then no person or
institution would have felt free to challenge racial segregation in the
South. New York Times, one of the most important decisions in the
history of the first amendment, was thus not only a triumph for free
expression; it was a triumph for civil rights and racial equality as
well.

59 See Stone, Content-NeutralRe,.strictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1987).
60 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273.
61 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
62 Id. at 222 n.125.
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I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in [Roth]
cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopar...
dizingfundamentalFirstAmendment values, and I have concluded that the time has come to make a significant departurefrom
that approach.63
64

In the years between Roth and ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,
the Court handed down more than forty decisions dealing with the
issue of obscenity. 65 During this era, at least five sharply distinct
definitions of obscenity emerged within the Court, no one of which
commanded a majority. Moreover, the breakdown of consensus was
compounded by disagreement over such issues as pandering and
"variable" obscenity.66 By 1967, the breakdown was so complete
that the Court took to deciding cases with one sentence orders that
simply announced the judgment of the Court. 67 After sixteen
years of such "experimentation and debate,"Justice Brennan finally
reached the conclusion in his dissenting opinion in Paris Adult
Theatre that "we are manifestly unable to describe [obscenity] except
by reference to concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish
clearly between protected and unprotected speech." 68 Brennan
thus concluded that "the outright suppression of obscenity cannot
be reconciled with the fundamental principles" of the first amend69
ment.
Building upon his opinion in Speiser Brennan observed that
although "'sensitive tools'" must "be used to carry out the 'separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech,'" in this context the
Court had failed "to provide 'sensitive tools' to separate obscenity
from other sexually oriented but constitutionally protected
63 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973) (Brennan,

J.,

dissenting).
64 413 U.S. 49 (1973). On the same day that the Court decided Paris Adult
Theatre, it also decided Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
65 For an overview of these decisions, see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN &

M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1120-24, 1141-45 (1986).
66 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a prohibition
on the sale of pornography to children); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966)
(upholding convictions for obscenity of those who sold materials which were
sadomasochistic); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (applying Roth
standards to pandering).
67 From 1967 to 1973, some thirty-one cases were disposed of in this manner. See
e.g., Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970) (per curiam) (citing only Redrup v. New
York,
6 8 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam)).
Paris Adult Theatre 413 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 83.
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speech." 70 Indeed, Brennan reasoned, the concept of obscenity is
so inherently vague that it "cannot be defined with sufficient
specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create
and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial
erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to
suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional
harms." 7 1 In such circumstances, "we must scrutinize with care the
state interest that is asserted to justify the suppression. For in the
absence of some very substantial interest in suppressing such
speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that seem to flow
inevitably from the effort." 72 The lessons of Speiser, Button, and
New York Times are plainly evident in Justice Brennan's ParisAdult
Theatre dissent.
Turning to the task of scrutinizing the state interest, Brennan
explained that "[b]ecause we assumed-incorrectly, as experience has
proved-that obscenity could be separated from other sexually
oriented expression without significant costs, ... we had no
occasion in Roth to probe the asserted state interest in curtailing
sexually oriented speech." 73 Putting aside "the state interests in
74
protecting children and in protecting unconsenting adults,"
Brennan observed that society's more generalized interests in
suppressing obscenity remain "essentially unfocused and ill defined"
and are "predicated on unprovable .. . assumptions about human
behavior, morality, sex, and religion." 75 Because such assumptions
"cannot validate a statute that substantially undermines the
guarantees of the First Amendment," 76 Brennan concluded that,
"at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive
exposure to unconsenting adults," 77 government cannot constitutionally attempt "wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on
78
the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents."
In abandoning his position in Roth, Brennan demonstrated the
extent to which the Court itself is a "marketplace of ideas" in which
conclusions are always tentative and open to reexamination in the
70 Id. at 79 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).

71 Id. at
72 Id.
73 Id. at
74 Id. at
75 Id. at
76 Id. at
77
Id. at
78 Id.

103.
105.
106.
109 (footnote omitted).
109-10.
113.
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light of new evidence and changed circumstances. Moreover, in
adhering to his Paris Adult Theatre dissent for the remainder of his
tenure,79 Brennan also demonstrated his personal commitment to
the proposition that "the best test of truth is the power of the
80
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,"
for he recognized that the Court's rejection of his position was itself
only provisional. If his colleagues continued to confront this view,
they, too, might eventually see the error of their ways.
[W]ith the rigid characterizationof a given locale as not a public
forum, there is a danger that certainforms of public speech at the
locale may be suppressed, even though they are basically compatible
with the activities otherwise occurring at the locale.81
At the time Justice Brennan joined the Court, public forum
doctrine was still in its infancy. 82 Although the Court had recognized a rudimentary right of individuals to speak in public streets
and parks, subject to reasonable regulation of time, place, and
manner, it had not yet addressed the issues involved in access to
other forms of public property. This was an issue that captured
Justice Brennan's energy and attention through most of his tenure.
It was an issue on which he was all too often on the losing side.
Because the formative decisions of the 1930s and 1940s
predicated the right to a public forum on the fact that streets and
83
parks had been used "time out of mind" for speech purposes,
they carried the implication that there exists no first amendment
right to use other forms of public property for such purposes. The
implication, in other words, was that access to such property for
speech purposes could be denied absolutely upon the state's naked
assertion of title. Not surprisingly, then, in one of the first
79 See, e.g., Randall Book Corp. v. Maryland, 464 U.S. 919, 919 (1983) (Brennan,

J., dissenting from order denying certiorari) (urging state court to review a conviction
for the sale of sadomasochistic materials); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 767
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's acceptance of diction

restrictions on radio broadcasts); McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 678 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (reversing conviction for selling obscene
materials).
80

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

81 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

82 See generally Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in PublicPlaces, 1974 SuP. CT. REV.
233 (elucidating the early developments of the public forum doctrine).
83 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (Roberts,J., concurring); see also
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (stating that "the streets are natural and
proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion").
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decisions to address this issue after Brennan's appointment, the
Court, over Brennan's dissent, proclaimed that "[t]he State, no less
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 84
In case after case throughout his tenure, Brennan argued for a
more expansive vision of the right to a public forum. In Greer v.
Spock, 85 for example, Brennan dissented from the Court's holding
that a military base could constitutionally exclude all political
activity, including speeches and leafleting, from the public areas of
the base. Although conceding that the military could "exclude
civilian traffic" entirely, Brennan maintained that it "could not
choose freely to admit all such traffic save for the traffic in
ideas."8 6 Brennan rejected the contention that the challenged
restriction could bejustified by references to "the national defense,"
for "if the recent lessons of history mean anything, it is that the
First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of
interests such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic
security." 87 Recalling New York Times, Brennan reminded the
Court that such "interests 'cannot be invoked as a talismanic
incantation to support any exercise of ... power.'" 8 8 Finally,
Brennan rejected the Court's argument that the interest in "military
neutrality" could justify the restriction, for "it borders on casuistry
to contend that by even-handedly permitting public expression to
occur in unrestricted portions of a military installation, the military
89
will be viewed as sanctioning the causes there espoused."
Similarly, in Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, ° Brennan dissented from the Court's holding that a state fair
could constitutionally prohibit political and religious groups from
distributing literature on the grounds of the fair, other than from
preassigned, rented booths. Brennan observed that this restriction
"sharply limit[s] the number of fairgoers to whom the proselytizers
and candidates can communicate their messages" and thus "consti91
tutes a significant restriction on First Amendment rights."

84 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
85 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
86 Id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 852.
88 Id. at 853 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967)).
89. d. at 867.
90 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
91 Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Unlike the Court, which readily accepted the contention that "if
fairgoers are permitted to distribute literature, large crowds will
92
gather, blocking traffic lanes and causing safety problems,"
Brennan pointed out that the fair officials had "failed to provide any
support for these assertions" and had made "no showing that
relaxation of the booth Rule would create additional disorder in a
fair that is already characterized by the robust and unrestrained
93
participation of hundreds of thousands of wandering fairgoers."
The restriction, Brennan concluded, was "not narrowly drawn to
advance the State's interests, and for that reason is unconstitu94
tional."
Finally, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 95
Brennan dissented from the Court's holding that a city constitutionally could prohibit the posting of signs on all public property. At
the outset, Brennan observed that the posting of signs is "a timehonored" and "particularly valuable" means of communicating
because "it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide
audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats ...
and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and
understood." 96 This means of expression, Brennan maintained, is
"'essential to the poorly financed causes of little people, ' " 97 and its
prohibition should be sustained only "if the government proves that
the ban ... furthers a substantial government objective, and ...
constitutes the least speech-restrictive means of achieving that
objective."9 8 Criticizing the Court for failing "to consider carefully" whether the city's "supposed commitment" to "eradicating 'visual
clutter'" was "genuine," 99 Brennan argued that "such statements
of aesthetic objectives should be accepted as substantial.., only if
the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an identified
objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are
unrelated to the restriction of speech."10 0 Because there was "no
indication that the City [had] addressed its visual clutter problem in
92 Id.

93 Id. at 661.
'4 Id. at 662.
95 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
96 Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 820 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)).
98 Id. at 824.

99 Id. at 827.

'00 Id. at 828.
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any other way than by prohibiting the posting of signs,"101 Brennan concluded that the "total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches
so completely on [the] use of an important medium of political

expression that it must be struck down as violative of the First
102
Amendment."
Justice Brennan's public forum jurisprudence called for a
"flexible approach."1 03 He consistently resisted the Court's effort
to pigeonhole public forum analysis 10 4 and repeatedly challenged
the Court's use of such artificial and often incoherent categories as
"quintessential," "limited," and "non" public fora.1 05 In Brennan's view, such formulae served only "to obfuscate rather than
clarify the issues." 10 6 Moreover, Brennan consistently chided the
Court for its "insensitivity" 10 7 to the need for a broad conception
of the public forum and its "cursory ... oversight"10 8 of the

interests asserted by government. Brennan's own conception of the
public forum-that in all cases the "crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time" 109-offered a
generous vision of the right. In Brennan's view, a robust "marketplace of ideas" necessarily presupposes an expansive public forum
right that guarantees access to a broad range of nonmainstream
means of communication for the expression of unpopular and
unorthodox ideas and opinions. As Brennan well understood, such
an expansive approach is essential if we are to assure the breadth,
diversity, and richness of the system of free expression.

101 Id. at 829.
102

Id. at 831.

103 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 818
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (utilizing such "incoherent" categories).
106 United States v. Kokind., 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3127 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
107 Taxpayers for Vincen4 466 U.S. at 818 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
108

Id. at 827.

10 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). This language from

Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Grayned resonates in the opinions of
Justice Brennan. See e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]ith the rigid characterization of a given locale as not a public forum,
there is the danger that certain forms of public speech at the locale may be
suppressed, even though they are basically compatible with the activities otherwise
occurring at the locale.").
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If there is a bedrock principle underlying the FirstAmendment, it
is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.110
Near the end of his tenure, Justice Brennan faced one of the
most controversial, emotional, and divisive issues he was to confront
as ajustice. Not surprisingly, he addressed the issue with clarity of
vision and strong commitment to the freedom of speech.
At the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory Lee
Johnson burned an American flag to express his opposition to
government policy. He was prosecuted and convicted of violating
a Texas statute that prohibited any person from desecrating the flag.
The statute defined "desecrating" as physically mistreating the flag
111
in a way that the actor "knows will seriously offend" others.
The Court invalidatedJohnson's conviction in a bitterly divided five11 2
to-four decision, with Justice Brennan writing the opinion.
After establishing that Johnson's burning of the American flag
was "'sufficiently imbued with elements of communication' to
implicate the First Amendment,""1
Brennan turned to the claim
that the State's interest in preventing breaches of the peace justified
Johnson's conviction. In rejecting this claim, Brennan made clear
that government may "not assume that every expression of a
provocative idea will incite a riot." 1 4 To the contrary, government may act only in accord with narrowly drawn and precise
regulations, and even highly provocative expression may not be
restricted on this basis unless it "'is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. ' "1 1 5
Brennan also rejected the state's argument that
Johnson's conduct fell within the "fighting words" doctrine.
Embracing a narrow construction of that doctrine, reminiscent of
his approach to libel in New York Times, Brennan explained that
Johnson's act was not within the purview of the fighting words
doctrine because "no reasonable onlooker would have regarded
Johnson's generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies
110 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989).

"' Id. at 2543 n.7.
112 See id. at 2533.
113

Id. at 2540 (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,

409 (1974)).
114
5

Id. at 2542.

" Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
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of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an
116
invitation to exchange fisticuffs."
Finally, Brennan turned to the State's asserted "interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity." 117 Although conceding the legitimacy of this interest,
Brennan explained that the objection was not to the State's ends,
but to its means of achieving them. Because the Texas law was "not
aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances," but at protecting "it only against impairments that would
cause serious offense to others,"Johnson's "political expression was
restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed." 118
In such circumstances "the State's asserted interest in preserving the
special symbolic character of the flag" must be subjected "to 'the
1 19
most exacting scrutiny.'"
Undertaking such scrutiny, Brennan invoked the "enduring
lesson" of the Court's prior decisions: "Government may not
prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message." 120 The Court had "never before ... held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of
that symbol or its referents," 121 and Brennan was not about to
breach that wall in Johnson, for "[t]o conclude that the Government
may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a
limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no
122
discernible or defensible boundaries."
In an eloquent peroration, Brennan concluded by observing that
the decision in Johnson "is a reaffirmation of the principles of
freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the
conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign
and source of our strength."1 23 In a sharp response to the dissenters, Brennan added that "[w]e do not consecrate the flag by
punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that
124
this cherished emblem represents."
116 id.
11

7Id.
at 2543.
119 Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
'18 Id.

120 Id. at 2546.

121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2547.
Id. at 2547-48.
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By resisting the temptation to erode fundamental first amendment principles concerning the hostile audience, fighting words,
and content discrimination in order to "justify" the suppression of
Johnson's concededly offensive expression, Brennan's opinion in
Johnson reaffirmed and solidified those principles in the most trying
of circumstances. In so doing, Johnson made a profoundly important contribution to our first amendment jurisprudence.
Johnsondid not, however, end the controversy over flag burning.
To the contrary, the decision provoked a frenzy of protest, and
immediately after the decision was announced President Bush called
for a constitutional amendment to overrule Johnson. Shortly
thereafter, Congress, partly in an effort to forestall such an
amendment, enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989.125 This
Act, which was designed to avoid the particular defects of the Texas
law, proscribed any conduct "that damages or mistreats a flag,
without regard to the actor's motive, his intended message, or the
likely effects of his conduct on onlookers." 12 6 The following
term, Brennan's last as a Justice, the Court, again bitterly divided,
invalidated the Flag Protection Act of 1989. Justice Brennan wrote
127
the opinion of the Court.
Brennan gave the government's argument short shrift. Although
conceding that the Act contained "no explicit content-based
limitation," Brennan observed that "it is nevertheless clear that the
Government's asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free
expression,'" for "the Government's desire to preserve the flag as a
symbol for certain national ideals is implicated 'only when a
person's treatment of the flag communicates [a] message' to others
that is inconsistent with those ideals." 128 Thus, although "Congress cast the Flag Protection Act in somewhat broader terms than
the Texas statute at issue in Johnson," it ultimately "suffers from the
same fundamental flaw: it suppresses expression out of concern"
129
for its message.
Brennan declined in Eichman to accept "the Government's
invitation to reassess" the conclusion that flag burning is protected
first amendment expression "in light of Congress' recent recognition of a purported 'national consensus' favoring a prohibition on
125 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-31, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
126 United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2408 (1990).
127 See id. at 2404.
128 Id. at 2408 (quoting Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547, 2546 (1989)).
'29 Id. at 2409.
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flag-burning," for even "assuming such a consensus exists, any
suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech
becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows
130
is foreign to the First Amendment."
Radical shifts in judicial doctrine are rare. They usually occur

over long periods step-by-step in a series of decisions.

"The

complex phenomenon which lawyers know as law is an always
unfinished product. It may be compared to a tapesty the weaving
of which is never done ... "131
It is possible in an essay of this nature to mention only a few of
the areas in which Justice Brennan contributed to our first amendment jurisprudence. I have not discussed his efforts, for example,
in the areas of patronage,13 2 prior restraint,1 3 3 charitable solicitation,1 3 4 commercial advertising,1 3 5 overbreadth,13 6 nonobscene but sexually explicit expression,13 7 freedom of the
press,1 38 residential picketing,13 9 the removal of books from
libraries, 140 and a host of other important first amendment areas.
What is clear, however, is thatJustice Brennan was a product of the
controversies that often divided the nation during his tenure on the
Court. His unique understanding of the freedom of speech was
shaped by those controversies and he, in turn, gave those controversies direction and helped the nation resolve them.
0

13 Id.
131 Brennan,

The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendmen 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1965) (quoting O'Meara, The Notre Dame Program:
Training Skilled Craftsmen and Leaders, 43 A.B.A.J. 614, 670 (1957)).
132 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
133 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
134 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
135 See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Posadas de Puerto
Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
136 See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
137 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
139 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
140 See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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Several themes emerge from Justice Brennan's first amendment
jurisprudence: procedural regularity, narrow specificity, toleration,
chilling effect, overbreadth, diversity, self-governance, and the like.
These themes are familiar. They are familiar because justice
Brennan made them so. There can be little doubt that Justice
Brennan stands alongside Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Black, and
Douglas as one of the staunchest defenders of the freedom of
speech our nation has ever known. They are in good company.

